INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a preliminary assessment of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association's ("IEEE-SA") revised patent policy under European Union ("EU") antitrust law and, in particular, under the rules prohibiting unlawful anticompetitive coordination provided in article 101 of the 2017]
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). 1 In February 2015, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued a business review letter ("BRL"), which concluded that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy did not deserve a challenge under the United States' antitrust rules, short of "likely harm to competition" and to the extent that its potential procompetitive benefits likely outweighed any possible harm. 2 This Article argues that a similar degree of forbearance might not have been possible if the analysis of the sections of the IEEE-SA revised patent policy related to the definition of "reasonable rates" had been conducted under EU competition law. This is because the case law of EU courts attaches cartel-type liability under TFEU article 101 to any coordinated interference with the price system, and this creates a risk of antitrust liability for licensing guidelines of the kind set out in the IEEE-SA revised patent policy.
To be clear, this Article does not argue that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy falls foul of TFEU article 101 as a possible form of horizontal buyer collusion, as previously argued by some authors, 3 but instead that it may plausibly give rise to EU antitrust exposure on the mere ground that it interferes with the free market price system. This Article then proceeds to explore the reasons that underpin the strict liability standard which prevails in EU competition law. It finds that the incipiency theory provides a possible ex post rationalization for the affirmation of cartel-type liability under TFEU article 101 for coordinated interferences with the price system. The Article concludes by arguing that antitrust agencies' invitations to Standard Setting Organizations ("SSOs") to adopt rules designed to rein in the alleged market power of standard-essential patent ("SEP") holders through private ordering 214 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:211 mechanisms may eventually bring them within the strictures of TFEU article 101, thereby creating an antitrust trap.
To show this, the Article proceeds in three steps. Part I describes the changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy in relation to the definition and calculation of "reasonable rates." Part II reviews EU case law under TFEU article 101, and demonstrates that the EU courts have progressively elaborated a strict rule of liability that outlaws any coordinated interferences with the price system. Part III explains that the inimicality toward coordinated interference with the price system observed in the case law may be rationalized on the basis of the "incipiency theory." Finally, Part IV concludes that private ordering institutions like SSOs have less margin of maneuver under EU competition law to remedy perceived concerns of patent holdup than what the BRL suggests is the case under U.S. antitrust law.
At this stage, some qualifications are in order. This Article only covers the changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy in relation to the concept of "reasonable rates." It does not discuss other changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy, such as restrictions on the availability of prohibitive orders, duty to license at all levels of production, rules on reciprocity, and grant backs. Moreover, the Article does not investigate the allegations of collusive conduct that were leveled at some members of IEEE-SA during the process that led to the development of the revised patent policy.
From a methodological standpoint, the analysis is primarily conducted on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU ("CJEU") and the General Court ("GC"). The Article deliberately leaves aside the policy documents and soft law instruments adopted by the European Commission ("the Commission") in this field. There are two reasons for this conservative approach. First, the judgments of the EU courts in Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence, and Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet ("Post Danmark II") have emphasized the inability of Commission soft law instruments to have binding effects on third parties, courts, and 2017] IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY 215 agencies. 4 Second, the formal and substantive validity of those instruments has not been tested before the EU Courts, and they can therefore not be deemed to provide a definitive and authoritative interpretation of the EU competition rules.
I. REASONABLE RATES UNDER THE IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY
A. Overview of the IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy
In the past decade, several important SSOs active in information technologies have internally discussed changes to their patent policies. 5 Within those SSOs, the demand for patent policy reform invariably originates from participants who are net technology buyers, and are based on concerns of alleged patent "holdup" by other SSO participants who are net technology sellers. 6 Calls for SSOs to take action against such perceived evils have also been fueled by external declarations from two of the world's most influential antitrust agencies-the U.S. DOJ and the Commission 7 -who seem to 4 Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, ¶ 52 (Oct. 6, 2015) , http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169191&pageIndex= 0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54286 [https://perma.cc/8LPJ-WCTJ]; Case C-226/11, Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence, ¶ ¶ 4, 12 (Dec. 13, 2012) , http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=131804& pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54095
[https:// perma.cc/42YR-BHU9]. 5 The issue has also been discussed within other SSOs active in the wireless communications industries, like the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI"). To date, no other SSO has yet introduced changes similar to those found in IEEE-SA revised patent policy. 6 The idea is that SEP holders use threats of injunctions to force firms to pay more. have accepted the patent holdup theory. 8 Proposals for SSO reform have generally consisted of spelling out in further detail the implications of Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory ("FRAND") commitments made by SEP holders. 9 FRAND commitments are voluntary, irrevocable assurances given by standard participants that they are prepared to grant licenses on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms for their patents that become essential to the implementation of a standard. 10 In this context, the IEEE-SA has been a pioneer. The IEEE-SA is one of the world's largest SSOs. 11 It operates in the electrical and information technologies sectors, and it is well known for the successful introduction of several cutting-edge wireless communications standards, including IEEE 802.11 (better known as Wi-Fi). 12 8 Further, they have waved the red scarf of antitrust intervention against SEP holders as an exceptional, last resort perspective. See, e.g., Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of Eur. Comm'n Responsible for Competition Policy, Address at the IP Summit: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-1042_en.htm [https://perma.cc/F7P6-FTKY]. The speech discussed the need to take action to remove injunctions when there is a willing licensee: "Ideally, this principle should be implemented by the standard-setting [organizations] themselves. But since that is not happening, I am willing to provide clarity to the market through competition enforcement." Id. [s] ," 14 following unsuccessful previous attempts to reduce the "inherent vagueness" of FRAND commitments given by SEP holders. 15 Readers familiar with the field will recall that, in 2007, the IEEE-SA tried to address the issue by adopting a patent policy that expressly permitted a patent holder to disclose its proposed maximum rates and other terms in a Letter of Assurances ("LOA"). In practice, the experience under the 2007 policy was a failure. 16 The IEEE-SA . In addition to providing guidance on the meaning of "reasonable rate," the updated patent policy: (i) clarifies that compliant implementations cover both end-use products and components or sub-assemblies, and that FRAND commitment indistinctly apply to all; (ii) restricts the availability of injunction or exclusion orders to patent holders to circumstances where the implementer fails to comply with the outcome of third-party judicial proceedings over FRAND-setting disputes, invalidity, enforceability, essentiality and infringement, and damages; and (iii) confirms that SEP holders can seek to benefit from grant backs on the licensee's SEPs and non-SEPs. See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1. 15 Request, supra note 14, at 10; see also Konstantinos Karachalios, Managing Dir., IEEE Standards Ass'n, Keynote Address at IEEE SIIT: "If It Works (For Me), Why Fix It?" Status Quo Versus Reforms at the Intersection Between the Patent System and Standardization (Oct. 6, 2015) . The address described the problem with the FRAND commitment concept: "To be clear, the problem is not the relative ambiguity of an incomplete contract, since most useful contracts include several levels and degrees of ambiguity. It is the total ambiguity of the basic definitions that makes such a contract totally vague and, thus, potentially tricky for the ones lured in it." Id.
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FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:211 only received two LOAs in which patent holders accepted to disclose maximum rates. 17 The 2015 revised patent policy has more teeth. It introduces a definition of a "reasonable rate" that applies to all patent holders that make an early FRAND commitment in an accepted LOA. 18 Under the adopted definition, reasonable rate means "appropriate compensation to the patent holder for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential Patent Claim's technology in the IEEE standard." 19 In other words, an SEP holder that makes a FRAND declaration commits that it will not charge royalties up to the value implementers would incur to switch technologies. 20 The definition of a "reasonable rate" is mandatory in the sense that it applies to all essential patent claims for which the IEEE-SA has an accepted LOA. It is, however, not mandatory in the sense that patent holders can still avoid to give a FRAND commitment and nonetheless participate in the standard-setting activities of In addition, the IEEE-SA updated patent policy recommends the consideration of three "factors" in the determination of reasonable rates during licensing negotiations. 22 Under the first factor, the rate should reflect the value contributed by the SEP-protected invention to the "value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable compliant implementation" of the SEP. 23 According to the BRL, this factor is designed to ensure that the royalty correctly reflects the added value of the patented invention, and nothing more. 24 See BRL, supra note 2, at 12-13. It is also often referred to as the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit ("SSPU") requirement.
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cur when the end product is complex and runs on many patented technologies. 25 Under the second factor, account shall be given to the relative value contributed by the SEP to the smallest saleable compliant implementation "in light of the value contributed by all Essential Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced in that Compliant Implementation." 26 The stated rationale behind the second factor is to mitigate "royalty stacking" risks, when SEP holders fail to consider the adverse cumulative effect of their royalty demands on the aggregate price for the standardized technology. 27 Finally, the third factor recommends considering "[e]xisting licenses covering use of the same Essential Patent Claim," provided they are "comparable" and were not obtained under the "threat of a Prohibitive Order." 28 Possible benchmarks include licensing terms entered into following voluntary negotiations or granted by courts in the context of assessing damages during litigation. 29 A degree of ambiguity persists on the binding nature of the three factors articulated in the IEEE-SA updated patent policy. On the one hand, the text emphatically prescribes that the "determination of reasonable rates should include, but need not be limited to, the consideration of" the three factors identified, suggesting that they constitute a core set of pricing rules. 30 On the other hand, the Frequently Asked Questions ("FAQs") issued by the IEEE-SA explain that the revised patent policy simply "recommends" but does not require the consideration of the three factors, suggesting that they constitute mere pricing guidelines. 31 The remainder of this Article relies on the latter reading in view of the fact that an SEP holder that is unwilling to submit a FRAND commitment can nonetheless continue to participate in IEEE-SA standards devel-25 Id. at 12. This is without, however, excluding the possibility of charging royalties expressed in terms of a share of the end-product price (end-product royalties See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 15 ("While the IEEE-SA Patent Policy recommends considerations for use in determining a Reasonable Rate, these considerations are not mandatory."); see also Request, supra note 14, at 18. opment activities. 32 That said, it is obvious that the former reading of the patent policy would have even more serious implications from an antitrust standpoint than the ones described in later sections.
B. Development of the IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and the DOJ Business Review Letter
The process that led to the adoption of the IEEE-SA revised patent policy was both protracted and controversial. 33 Four drafts of the updated patent policy were published for public review and comment. 34 A flood of comments was received. 35 The definition and calculation of reasonable rates proved particularly contentious. A debate occurred between technology developing firms, desirous to maintain flexibility in ex post licensing negotiations, and technology implementing firms, intent on limiting ex ante the bargaining power of SEP holders through a stricter definition of FRAND. 36 In most consensus-driven SSOs, such a divide would have been fatal to the proposed policy changes. However, a distinguishing feature of IEEE-SA is that it appears to be able to adopt such modifications under majority vote. In August 2014, the IEEE-SA Standards Board eventually adopted the updated version following a fourteen-to-five vote. 37
In the course of its development, the revised patent policy gave rise to possible concerns of antitrust liability. 38 Communications 32 See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 9 (stating that submitting a LOA is "not a precondition to participation"). technology company Ericsson argued that the reasonable rate definition could lead to "the collective establishment of mandatory, uniform license terms that will reduce the compensation for standard essential patents, akin to a buyer's side cartel." 39 In a letter to the DOJ, 40 J. Gregory Sidak, a well-known antitrust scholar and consultant, expressed concerns that the proposed "amendments posed a serious risk of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by facilitating tacit or explicit collusion among implementers to suppress the royalties they pay for SEPs." 41
Arguably to appease those concerns, the IEEE-SA requested a BRL from the DOJ. 42 On February 2, 2015, the DOJ officially stated in a BRL that it had no intention to challenge the IEEE-SA revised patent policy under the antitrust rules. 43 The DOJ's BRL is a succinct policy statement that is relatively devoid of analytical content. The exercise conducted by the DOJ essentially consisted in assessing whether the revised patent policy would "harm competition by anticompetitively reducing royalties and thereby diminishing incentives to innovate." 44 Two general considerations seem to underpin the DOJ's decision to dismiss antitrust charges. First, the DOJ observed that the IEEE-SA revised policy could not have any bearing on the setting of royalty rates which "ultimately are determined through bilateral negotiations." 45 Second, the DOJ stressed that both the definition of reasonable rates and the three pricing factors remain optional. 46 In a section specifically dedicated to the IEEE-SA definition of "reasonable rates," the BRL considered possible justifications for the revised patent policy. 48 It noted that the mandatory definition reduced the possibility that SEP holders will "hold up implementers of a standard and obtain higher prices . . . than would have been possible before the standard was set." 49 In relation to the three factors, the BRL cited a variety of patent-not antitrustcase law references to denote that the revised patent policy is consistent with judicial precedent. 50 The DOJ concluded its BRL on an optimistic note, stating that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy will "benefit competition and consumers by facilitating licensing negotiations, mitigating hold up and royalty stacking, and promoting competition among technologies for inclusion in standards." 51
The adoption of the BRL has not extinguished the controversy surrounding the IEEE-SA revised patent policy-much to the contrary. Technology developing firms with significant patent positions have complained that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is skewed toward technology implementers, 52 and firms have threat-47 Id. at 8. This particular point is the subject of dispute. While the IEEE-SA has submitted to the DOJ that the changes could be bypassed, the IEEE-SA has continued to label them as a "clarification" of its patent policy, which tends to suggest that they are mandatory. INNOVATION 301, 303 (2016) . According to Sidak, this "bias suggests that [decision-making] at the IEEE was controlled by parties that seek to devalue SEPs." Id.
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IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY 223 ened to reconsider their participation in the IEEE-SA under the revised patent policy. 53 Some scholars have also leveled trenchant critiques at the BRL. Sidak argued that the DOJ has applied a "laxer standard to the risk of collusion over the prices that buyers will pay for SEPs" than the standard usually applied "over the prices that the very same buyers will pay for other kinds of essential inputs." 54 Legal scholars Thomas A. Lambert and Alden F. Abbott analogized the IEEE-SA revised patent policy to an "illegal monopsony buyer cartel," and decried the DOJ's policy under the BRL as "perverse antitrust policy" which "threatens to raise Type II error costs." 55
II. COORDINATED INTERFERENCE WITH THE PRICE SYSTEM AS A RESTRICTION BY OBJECT UNDER TFEU ARTICLE 101
This Article submits that an antitrust agency would have reached a conclusion opposite to that reached by the DOJ had it conducted its analysis under EU antitrust standards. SSOs' attempts to clarify the concept of "reasonable rates" are likely to give rise to antitrust liability under TFEU article 101 without the need to adduce further facts. The basis for this contention is that, through the years, the case law handed down by the CJEU under TFEU article 101 has evolved to attach cartel-type antitrust liability to any coordinated interference with the free market price system. The following sections review this case law, explore its normative 53 Those companies include Nokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm, and InterDigital, among others. See Crouch, supra note 36; see also InterDigital Letter, supra note 47; Bill Merritt, Why We Disagree with the IEEE's Patent Policy, EETIMES (Mar. 27, 2015, 7 :00 AM), http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?doc_id=1326144&section_id=36
[https:// perma.cc/KR53-NYH6] ("A handful of manufacturers of devices-the people who pay for the use of the technology-essentially co-opted the IEEE patent committee.").
implications, and discuss its application to the IEEE-SA revised patent policy.
Admittedly, the case law is not specific to SSOs, let alone to patents and intellectual property ("IP") rights. Yet, given that EU antitrust law observes the general principle of symmetryaccording to which antitrust law treats intellectual property as it treats any other form of property 56 -there is no reason to segregate SSO patent policies from the application of this body of cases. The existence of specific agency guidelines on the matter does not modify the assessment.
A. EU Courts' Case Law
EU antitrust law goes well beyond treating only horizontal price-fixing as brazen violations of TFEU article 101. It is a widely known state of affairs-and one often criticized in legal academia and practice-that the first paragraph of TFEU article 101 catches as restrictions "by object" (the legal equivalent of a per se infringement in U.S. antitrust law) many less patently anticompetitive forms of collusion. 57 What may be less well understood, however, is that the CJEU case law generally considers any coordinated conduct that interferes with the pricing system as a restriction by object. 58 Id. ¶ 60. 59 One of these cases is not a court case, but a Commission decision. This Article reviews it, nonetheless, because it is a transposition of an interesting GC judgment under TFEU article 102.
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FEDETAB
In Heintz van Landewyck SARL v. Commission of the European Communities (also known as "FEDETAB"), the board of a nonprofit trade association with oversight of ninety-five percent of tobacco production in Belgium issued a recommendation to regulate the wholesale and retail trades of cigarettes. 60 The recommendation set out maximum discounts and minimum quantity requirements for cigarette distribution, uniform end-of-year rebates, and standardized terms of payment (cash and specific credit periods). 61 The Commission analyzed the recommendation as a restriction of competition by object and effect, and declared it contrary to article 85 of the European Economic Community ("EEC") Treaty, 62 which later became TFEU article 101. 63 On appeal before the CJEU, the applicants claimed that the recommendation was not binding and that it could not, therefore, possibly restrict competition. 64 The court dismissed the allegation on the facts, and sided with the Commission's finding that the recommendation operated as a "genuine mandatory rule of conduct" adopted by the major industry players sitting in FEDETAB's board. 65 What is more, the court suggested that the question of the formal mandatory nature of the recommendation was to some extent irrelevant. 66 In the court's view, as long as a substantial number of firms endorse the recommendation-the court wrote of "compliance with the recommendation"-then the recommendation can be deemed to have a "profound influence on competition in the market" and infringe TFEU article 101. See id. at 3250-51. The court also described the parties in the case as firms "who control a substantial part of the total cigarette sales in Belgium." Id.
SCK and FNK
In the second case, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. Commission of the European Communities, Dutch firms that rent mobile cranes to the construction, petrochemical, and transport industries set up a trade association and a certification body under the names SCK and FNK. 68 At some point, FNK introduced a statutory requirement that its members charge "reasonable rates" for both external crane hiring transactions vis-à-vis clients and internal renting operations amongst members. 69 In parallel, FNK sought to give guidance on the meaning of "reasonable rates" by issuing internal rates for transactions amongst crane hiring firms, and by publishing a handbook comprising cost calculations and recommended rates for transactions with external clients. 70 The general conditions established by FNK also contained conditions concerning prices, such as minimum rental hours, higher rates for Sundays and holidays, and a prohibition of charging cancellation costs. 71 The case was scrutinized by the Commission, which suspected that the system operated as a facilitating device for horizontal collusion. 72 During the administrative proceedings, a discussion took place on the nature of the concept of "reasonable rates." 73 FNK argued that its members were entirely free "to interpret the concept 'reasonable.'" 74 The Commission objected to this, noting that "the reasonability of rates was discussed between the crane-[hiring] companies and FNK" and that "FNK members were ob- 
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IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY 227 liged under . . . the internal rules to charge 'reasonable' rates." 75 The Commission found that the "system of recommended and internal rates, which is intended to give substance to the concept of 'reasonable rates'" falls within the scope of TFEU article [101 (1)]. 76 The facts suggest that the Commission's concerns were not with the requirement to set "reasonable rates." Instead, its objections were to the mandatory measures taken to interpret the concept of reasonable rates, including the fixing of rates at a level superior to market rates.
On appeal, the parties challenged the Commission's decision on the ground that the recommended and internal "rates were intended to serve only as an aid to specific negotiations and had no binding force at all." 77 The GC dismissed the argument. 78 It held that those rates which "give substance to the concept of reasonable rates" were "in fact a pricing system binding its members." 79 Admittedly, SCK and FNK is a case that belongs to the horizontal price-fixing genre. That said, it suggests that the risk of antitrust liability increases when a trade association seeks to give binding force and substance to "reasonable rates" requirements.
Dole Food Company
In Dole Food Company, Inc. v. European Commission, four worldwide producers of fresh fruit had coordinated their quotation prices for bananas exported to the European Union. 80 The Commission classified the infringement as a "cartel," and imposed pe-75 Id. The Commission concluded that the claim that they were "'completely free' when setting their rates [was] therefore inaccurate." Id. nalties totaling € 60.3 million (around $85 million at the time). 81 The decision was first appealed to the GC, 82 and then to the CJEU. 83 Both courts affirmed the Commission's analysis in full and dismissed the appeals. 84 The theory of liability advanced in the Commission's decision was that the parties had unlawfully entertained "bilateral prepricing communications during which they discussed banana price setting factors, that is factors relevant for setting of quotation prices for the upcoming week." 85 The problem, in the eyes of the Commission and of the courts, was that this coordination was designed to "reduce uncertainty." 86 On closer examination, the impugned conduct had several original features. First, the case concerned quotation prices for bananas, not transaction prices, which were subsequently determined through bilateral negotiations with customers. 87 The Commission's decision spoke, in that respect, of "pre-pricing communications." Second, the parties were not engaged in discussions over quotation prices, but over quotation price trends and "price setting factors, that is factors relevant for setting of quotation prices." 88 Those somewhat uncommon features-namely, the remoteness of the conduct from market transactions and the abstract content of the topics discussed-did not dissuade the Commission from pursuing 81 See Case COMP/39.188, Bananas, ¶ 115 (stating that "quotation prices served at least as market signals, trends and/or indications as to the intended development of banana prices, and that they were relevant for the banana trade and the prices obtained"). 88 See id. ¶ 51; see also Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food, ¶ 14. In reality, the Commission objected to both (i) price-setting factors, "and (ii) price trends and indications of quotation prices for the forthcoming week before those quotation prices were set." Id.
¶ 96.
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the case as a plain vanilla cartel, and qualifying the infringement as a "restriction by object." 89 In their appeal before the CJEU, the parties challenged both aspects. 90 Their first argument was that "the subjects to which the pre-pricing communications related was too general for it to be possible, on that basis, for them to determine with certainty the future conduct on the market." 91 They contended that "not all discussions concerning factors that might be relevant to price-setting are sufficiently deleterious to merit classification as a restriction of competition by object." 92 The CJEU disposed of the claim by holding that those communications "related to factors which had an influence on supply vis-à-vis demand, market conditions and price developments." 93
The applicants also argued that pre-pricing communications on quotation price trends could not be deemed a restriction by object because "quotation prices were far removed from actual prices." 94 The GC judgment had actually acknowledged that pre-pricing communications on price-setting factors like the weather were "innocuous." 95 The applicants thus argued that the mere fact that pre-pricing communications "might have a certain influence on prices is not sufficient to establish . . . restriction . . . by object." 96 The court, again, rejected this view. 97 While the court addressed the argument on quotation prices trends, insisting on their important role in the formation of actual prices, the court did not proceed to explain the anticompetitive impact of communications on prepricing factors. 98 Instead, the court took a more principled ap- 89 The case originated from a leniency application by Chiquita. Id. ¶ 130 ("[Q]uotation prices were relevant to the market concerned, since, on the one hand, market signals, market trends or indications as to the intended development of banana prices could be inferred from those quotation prices, which were important for the proach, affirming somewhat discretionarily that "the pre-pricing communications had the object of creating conditions of competition that do not correspond to the normal conditions on the market and therefore gave rise to a concerted practice having as its object the restriction of competition within the meaning of [TFEU article 101]." 99
T-Mobile Netherlands
In T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, the five wireless communications operators in the Netherlands had shared information over remunerations paid to dealers. 100 The case looked like a classic information exchange, with the significant difference that the conspirators had only met once to discuss dealers' payments. 101 The Dutch competition agency nonetheless issued fines. 102 As the case progressed through the Dutch appeals system, a court considered that the fact that there had only been a "single meeting" called into question the applicability of the implementation presumption which holds that-in concerted practice cases where the burden of proof is discharged on the basis of circumstantial evidence-the existence of an exchange of information can be presumed to influence the parties' conduct on the market. 103 It thus referred the case to the CJEU, asking for clarification on whether the implementation presumption also applied in the case of an "isolated event," or if, by contrast, "a certain degree of regularity over a lengthy period" was needed. 104 The national court also sought to understand if an exchange of information which did not have the object of raising conbanana trade and the prices obtained and, on the other, in some transactions the actual prices were directly linked to the quotation prices."). 
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sumer prices could nevertheless be deemed a restriction by object. 105 Unsurprisingly, the court's answer to the second question was that "to find that a concerted practice has an anti-competitive object, there does not need to be a direct link between that practice and consumer prices." 106 The wording of TFEU article 101 indeed accommodates as restrictions by object any coordination that "directly or indirectly fix[es] purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions." 107 Perhaps less evidently, the court reaffirmed the implementation presumption even when the concerted practice is "isolated." 108 In the court's view, it cannot be ruled out that a "meeting on a single occasion" may constitute a sufficient basis to distort competition. 109 The court then went on to explain that, in real markets, firms can seek "to concert action on a selective basis in relation to a one-off alteration in market conduct with reference simply to one parameter of competition," though one may question if such thin coordination can effectively harm competition. 110
Raw Tobacco Italy
In Raw Tobacco Italy, the Commission fined four processors of raw tobacco who had operated a buyer cartel to reduce the prices paid to farmers and intermediaries in Italy. 111 The impugned conduct was garden-variety horizontal collusion, and included the joint fixing of purchase prices, a mechanism of allocation of suppliers and quantities and the exchange of confidential information. 112 The case attracted a great deal of attention in practitioners' circles, as it 105 See id. ¶ 19. 106 Id. ¶ 39.
107
Id. ¶ 37. Further, the facts showed that dealers' remunerations were a "decisive factor in fixing the price to be paid by the end user." Id. [Vol. XXVII:211 was the first in which the Commission refused to grant immunity to a leniency applicant who had subsequently divulged details of its application to co-cartelists. 113 On appeal, the EU court fully upheld the Commission's analysis. 114
In addition to its buyer coordination aspects, the interest of this decision for this Article lies in another, relatively unnoticed aspect. 115 In the course of the administrative proceedings, some defendants attempted to justify some of their collusive activities on the ground that they had sought to "eliminate the power that intermediaries could enjoy on the basis of their illegal activities," including possibly "organi[z]ed crime" activity. 116 Other raw tobacco processors argued that they intended to "establish a transparent auction system for the sale of tobacco which would have made the purchase of raw tobacco more efficient and significantly reduced the role of intermediaries." 117
The Commission dismissed both justifications on legal grounds, paying no heed to the factual merits of the argument. 118 In the Commission's view: (1)], such as those described in this Decision, cannot be justified by the aim to counteract third parties' allegedly illegal conduct. It is clearly not the task of undertakings to take steps contrary to [TFEU article 101(1)] to counteract [behavior] which, rightly or wrongly, they regard as illegal and/or contrary to their own interests. 
Serious infringements of [TFEU article [101
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And the Commission went even further, mooting that such conduct could not even qualify for exemption under TFEU article 101(3). 120
The point was not further discussed during the appeals that took place before the EU courts. However, the Commission's reasoning in Raw Tobacco Italy is an explicit transposition of the established case law of the EU courts in single firm conduct cases. 121 In Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, the GC ruled that a dominant firm cannot justify anticompetitive tying on grounds of a perceived necessity to ensure product safety, when specific laws and enforcement institutions exist to that effect. 122
B. Normative Implications
All of the cases from this Article's sample led the courts and the Commission to affirm antitrust liability under TFEU article 101(1), and, in a majority of them, the impugned coordination was formally qualified as a "restriction by object." 123 In EU antitrust law, this is the closest one can come to the non-treaty notion of a "cartel." Despite their differences, each of the cases conveys legal principles of relevance for the analysis of the changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy under EU antitrust law. This section considers each in turn. 120 See id. ¶ ¶ 291-92 ("Had the processors genuinely intended to justify their [behavior] on sound economic and legal arguments, they should have invoked the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. In any event, there are no elements in the Commission's file indicating that [TFEU article 101(3)] could apply to the infringements described in this Decision."). 121 The Commission's decision makes an analogy with the TFEU article 102 case law in Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, where the court held, in relation to a dominant firm that was trying to justify an alleged abusive tying, that: "[T]here are laws in the United Kingdom attaching penalties to the sale of dangerous products and to the use of misleading claims as to the characteristics of any product. There are also authorities vested with powers to enforce those laws. In those circumstances it is clearly not the task of an undertaking in a dominant position to take steps on its own initiative to eliminate products which, rightly or wrongly, it regards as dangerous or at least as inferior in quality to its own products." Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm'n, 1991 SCK and FNK suggests that a trade association can lawfully introduce "reasonable rates" requirements. 124 However, the ruling also shows that the introduction of rate-related requirements paves the way to the applicability of TFEU article 101(1), and the risk of antitrust liability increases gradually as the trade association undertakes to give "substance" to rate-related requirements. 125 In the case at hand, the Commission easily found antitrust liability in light of the direct coordination of trade association participants on quantitative rate levels (internal and recommended). 126 But, this leaves open the question of whether indirect coordination on rate-setting factors or qualitative methodologies would have attracted antitrust liability.
The answer to this question may be found in Dole Food. 127 The facts quoted in the opinion and judgments suggest that "by object" restrictions occur when rivals coordinate their understanding of abstract, non-quantitative factors like the weather, holiday periods, and market trends, among other factors. 128 In its decision, the Commission objected in general and abstract terms to coordination on "price setting factors," which it defined as "factors influencing supply vs. demand." 129 The parties in the proceedings actually ironized on this, noting that their coordination was referred in the industry as "radio banana." 130 Dole Food is also important because it held that "pre-pricing" coordination suffices to trigger antitrust liability. 131 In other words, remote coordination well ahead of market transactions is a source of TFEU article 101 (1) 
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IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY 235 similar teaching, in the sense that early, one-off coordination can be deemed a restriction of competition "by object." 132 Third, Raw Tobacco Italy 133 serves as a reminder that objective justifications are not in the cards when firms engage in "by object" restrictions. To be more accurate, Raw Tobacco Italy transposes the GC's Hilti AG 134 case law to the area of coordinated conduct. Under Hilti AG, firms cannot justify anticompetitive conduct by the need to forestall the illegal behavior of others. 135 In Hilti AG, the court emphasized that such justifications are not available when specific legal institutions and enforcement structures exist to remedy the illegality. 136 In other words, this statement means that firms cannot resort to (unlawful) anticompetitive private ordering remedies like buyer coordination to curb (unlawful) anticompetitive supplier conduct. 137 In more mundane terms, it is not the role of firms to correct antitrust infringements through recourse to other antitrust infringement when specific regulatory institutions are in place. Two wrongs do not make a right in antitrust law.
FEDETAB made the important point that nonbinding recommendations issued by representative institutions can give rise to a restriction by object if they are endorsed by a sufficient number of member firms. 138 In other words, the greater the number of industry participants who decide to comply with the industry recommendation, the greater the risk of antitrust exposure. the buyer level. While this point is not the most spectacular, it is worth recalling, given the positive stance generally taken by antitrust policy toward buyer power.
All in all, there is a credible claim to make that TFEU article 101(1) prohibits, as a restriction by object, any coordinated interference with the price system. This strict legal regime is not unprecedented. It shares many similarities with the "rigid" situation that prevailed in U.S. antitrust law after the U.S. Supreme Court's 1940 ruling in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 141 In this case, the Supreme Court wrote in dicta that the Sherman Act condemned any combination which tampers with the price system. 142 The Court wrote:
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital part of our economy against any degree of interference. Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the good intentions of the members of the combination. 
IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY 237
Since then, courts have relaxed the Socony case law, 144 but it is interesting to note that no similar evolution-with anecdotal exceptions-seems to have taken place in EU competition law. 145 In contrast, in close intellectual proximity with the Supreme Court of the 1940s, the EU courts have built an edifice of case law that seems to repute as unlawful and a restriction by object any coordination that interferes with the free market price system.
Even the celebrated CJEU judgment in the 2014 case Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission, 146 which put an 144 Most commentators underline that Socony remains good law, yet they stress that the Supreme Court has practically brought derogations by permitting defendants to raise rule of reason type arguments. See, e.g., GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 141, at 195 ("Since the late 1970s, with the notable exception of Maricopa, the Court's horizontal pricing jurisprudence has demonstrated a willingness to modify the traditional per se/rule of reason dichotomy. At a minimum, BMI and NCAA authorize courts to expand the characterization component of the traditional per se standard and explicitly entertain a fuller assessment of defendants' claims that the price-setting behavior has nontrivial procompetitive merit."); see also In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The plaintiffs retreat to the general language in the Socony-Vacuum opinion, an opinion 72 years old and showing its age."). Judge Posner proceeded to examine the many relaxations brought to Socony by the Supreme Court's case law. See id. at 1012-14.
145 See, e.g., Case C-35/99, Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. I-1529 In Arduino, for instance, the court accepted the idea that the "public interest" may justify the fixing of minimum and maximum prices by bar associations. Id. Further, even though this aging case law has only been rarely applied, it is also true that the court has never taken steps to reverse it and has occasionally referred to it in subsequent cases. Moreover, the recent case law of the EU courts suggests that some coordinated interferences with the price system deserve to be treated under the rule of reason. In the 2014 judgment in MasterCard, Inc. v. European Commission, the CJEU found that the multilateral interchange fees ("MIFs") collectively set by the MasterCard payment system were problematic because they reduced "the possibility of prices [for merchants] dropping below a certain threshold." Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard, Inc. v. Comm'n, ¶ 193 (Sept. 11, 2014) , http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157521& pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=832893
[https:// perma.cc/JCV3-ZSZD]. Like the GC in MasterCard, however, the court scrutinized this price interference under the rule of reason. See C-382/12 P, MasterCard, ¶ 129 (citing Case T-111/08, MasterCard, Inc. v. Comm'n, ¶ ¶ 143, 163-164 (May 24, 2012) end to the open-ended interpretation of the notion of a restriction by object, is compatible with this Article's understanding of the case law. Admittedly, the strict liability rule applied to coordination that tampers with the price system fits the Cartes Bancaires restricted scope requirement whereby the notion of restriction of competition by object "can be applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition," so long as the court views such interferences with the price system as the supreme evil of antitrust. 147
To conclude, this Article notes that its interpretation of coordinated interference with the price system as a restriction by object also seems to be the Commission's understanding. In a not so distant past the Commission held that railway companies active in the "International Railways Union" had restricted competition by jointly defining provisions "on the structure of sales prices" for rail haulage and the "methods for determining such prices." 148 Even though the price "structure established by the railway companies [did] not directly concern haulage prices," it nevertheless had "an indirect effect on tariff levels." 149
C. Applied Analysis
At the outset, it seems uncontroversial to consider that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy can be analogized to a price recommendation by an industry association, likely to trigger the applicability of TFEU article 101(1). However, at a deeper level of analysis, the definition of "reasonable rates" and the three factors listed in the policy 150 seem to constitute an attempt to "give substance" to the content of the IEEE-SA's FRAND commitment, which pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=834032
[https:// perma.cc/ART3-VKH9] ("The concept of restriction of competition 'by object' can be applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be found that there is no need to examine their effects . . . ."). 
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IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY 239 gradually raises the risk of antitrust liability along the lines described in SCK and FCK. 151 This is confirmed in the letter addressed by IEEE-SA to the DOJ in support of its request, which is rife with references to the revised patent policy's goal to "provide greater clarity." 152
In addition, the fact that neither the concept of a reasonable rate nor the three factors are given quantitative content is not sufficient to defuse the risk of antitrust liability, as clearly shown in Dole Food. 153 This point seemed critical in the DOJ assessment, which noted that the revised patent policy did not impose "any specific royalty calculation methodology." 154 In contrast, in EU antitrust law, a shared understanding on mere pricing "considerations" seems to merit severe antitrust scrutiny under article 101(1) TFEU. 155 A similar analysis applies to the fact that the actual definition of licensing rates is "left to parties' negotiations." 156 In its BRL, the DOJ dismissed concerns of antitrust harm as "unlikely to occur as a result of the [u]pdate given that, inter alia, licensing rates ultimately are determined through bilateral negotiations . . . ." 157 As seen above, EU antitrust law finds antitrust liability by object, even if the coordination is too remote from market transactions to entitle the parties to control the market price. 158 In reality, mere interference with the free market price system seems to be a sufficient 151 concern to trigger a finding of restriction by object under TFEU article 101(1).
Last, the contention that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is optional and can be disregarded by standards participants was perhaps relevant in the DOJ analysis, but has little significance from an EU antitrust standpoint. 159 As FEDETAB makes abundantly clear, it is sufficient that the recommendation receives substantial endorsement from market participants. 160 On the facts, this is manifestly the case, otherwise the policy would have never attracted a majority of votes within the IEEE-SA governing bodies. Further, the IEEE-SA website confirms that several large firms such as Broadcom, Intel, and Samsung have already issued LOAs that were deemed to comply with the revised patent policy. 161 All this notwithstanding, this Article's reasoning could be criticized on the ground that several of the cases cited concern secret and direct communication between firms over pre-pricing factors, and not public and indirect pricing recommendations within the formal framework of a trade association. However, this objection is not fatal. When a trade association declares that members A, B, and C shall apply pricing principles X and Y, it is the same as having market rivals A and B, and B and C, enter into secret contact to agree that they will apply pricing principles X and Y.
In sum, the rulings of the EU courts point to an unlawful restriction by object when an industry association remotely recommends the application of qualitative pricing factors in future market transactions. 162 
IEEE-SA REVISED PATENT POLICY 241 facts, but law. In the EU, a cartel-type prohibition rule applies to any coordination that interferes with the price system. 163 Beyond IEEE-SA, the case law of the EU courts more generally creates a serious risk of antitrust exposure for SSOs that contemplate similar changes to their patent policy. To be sure, the argument here is not that EU antitrust agencies would-let alone should-take action against SSOs patent policies for infringement of TFEU article 101, 164 or that the EU antitrust agencies would not use their margin of discretion to dismiss complaints against SSOs, settle such cases, or extend the benefit of an exemption under TFEU article 101(3). On the contrary, major world antitrust agencies have generally cast a favorable eye on such changes. In 2006, the DOJ issued a BRL, finding no need to challenge VMEbus International Trade Association's ("VITA") new patent policy, which prescribed a commitment by working group members to declare "the maximum royalty rates and most restrictive non-royalty terms." 165 In 2010, the Commission took exactly the same position in its guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements. 166 . The DOJ recalled the procompetitive effects of collaborative standard-setting processes. See VITA BRL, supra, at 7. It noted the potential of standard setting to generate exclusionary and collusive effects, which could be found to harm competition. Id. In light of this, the DOJ undertook an analysis of the new patent policy under the rule of reason. Id. at 8. The DOJ eventually issued the business review letter finding no cause for antitrust concern. Id. at 10. It nonetheless called VITA, the VITA Standards Organization, and its member companies "vigilantly to continue to educate working group participants about the severe consequences of such activities." Id. 166 See Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101, supra note 57, ¶ 299 ("[S]hould a standard-setting organi[z]ation's [intellectual property rights] policy choose to provide for [intellectual property rights] holders to individually disclose their most restrictive Commission additionally stated in a footnote that, in its view, the prohibition of TFEU article 101 did not prevent IPR holders to individually take "the decision to license [intellectual property rights] essential to a standard on royalty-free terms;" 167 though this statement of forbearance came with the caveat that this "should not serve as a cover to jointly fix prices either of downstream products or of substitute [intellectual property rights]/technologies." 168 Instead, this Article's point is that regardless of the policy preferences expressed by antitrust agencies, changes of the kind introduced by the IEEE-SA should be given serious consideration under the case law adopted pursuant to TFEU article 101. Courts and arbitration tribunals dealing with patent infringement cases, patent damages litigation, or rate-setting proceedings could indeed be faced with a new form of competition defense (or counter-defense), raised by SEP holders who do not comply with an SSO's patent policy-e.g., a SEP holder requests royalties that reflect the added value of the end product-to avoid the consummation of an unlawful restriction of competition by object within the meaning of TFEU article 101. For example, an unlicensed implementer subject to injunction proceedings may argue in defense that the SEP owner has violated the IEEE-SA patent policy by bringing infringement proceedings following the failure of negotiations based on a proposed rate that is unreasonable in view of the new definition. A possible counter-defense by the SEP owner could be that the IEEE-SA definition of "reasonable rates" in not enforceable, given its contrariety with TFEU article 101.
Interestingly, the risk of violation of TFEU article 101(1) could also offer a retrospective explanation for the CJEU's conservative ruling in Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. 169 In his opinion licensing terms, including the maximum royalty rates they would charge, prior to the adoption of the standard, this will normally not lead to a restriction of competition within the meaning of [a]rticle 101(1).").
167
Id. ¶ 274 n.109. 168 Id. ¶ 299 n.124. In other words, the decision to license on royalty-free terms shall remain individual, and firms shall not jointly decide that licensing must take place on a royalty-free basis. to the court, Advocate General Wathelet suggested that the court invite SSOs "to establish minimum conditions or a framework of 'rules of good conduct' for the negotiation of FRAND licensing terms." 170 In its judgment, the CJEU did not follow the invitation, possibly in light of the inconsistency between such a pronouncement and the court's case law under TFEU article 101(1). 171
In sum, in the United States, the main antitrust concern that scholars have leveled at the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is one of buyer collusion. In the European Union, a less facts-dependent standard of liability applies, with the result that the risk of antitrust liability under European law is considerably higher for SSOs that consider changes of the kind introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent policy.
III. RATIONALE: INCIPIENCY THEORY
EU competition law brings any coordinated interference with the price system under a quasi per se prohibition rule, similar to the standard of liability applied in cartel cases under U.S. law. Perhaps no other case conveys this philosophy better than the Dole Food decision, where the fact that the impugned coordination had "an influence on supply vis-à-vis demand" was deemed sufficient to find a restriction by object. 172 This strict legal standard is presumably based on deeper legal and economic considerations. Unfortunately, however, the CJEU 0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=51500 [https://perma.cc/G8SG-ELT6]. 170 See Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., C-170/13 ¶ 11 (Nov, 20, 2014) , http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? docid=159827&doclang=EN [https://perma.cc/FVY2-C28S]. The opinion further continued: "Without these, not only actions for a prohibitory injunction but also the rules on abuse of a dominant position, which should be employed only as solutions of last resort, are being used as a negotiating tool or a means of leverage by the SEP-holder or the undertaking which implements the standard and uses the teaching protected by that SEP." Id. 171 See Case C-170/13, Huawei, ¶ 77.
172
Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm'n, ¶ ¶ 97, 107 (Mar. 19, 2015) , http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex= 0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009
[https://perma.cc/ NL9M-Y6K2].
